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The Camel Corps Experiment
Abstract
“Did you know there was a push to create a Camel Corps right before the beginning of the American Civil
War?” This certainly seems like an interesting piece of trivia to share around the dinner table, but what was the
Camel Corps and what insights can it provide on U.S. military thinking in the mid-19th century? I believe that
the Camel Corps Experiment, regardless of whether it was deemed an utter failure or not, demonstrated
progressive military thought and the desire of its advocates to explore advancements in both mobility and
technology for military practices. [excerpt]
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 The Camel Corps Experiment 
By Abigail Major ’19 
“Did you know there was a push to create a Camel Corps right before the beginning of 
the American Civil War?” This certainly seems like an interesting piece of trivia to share 
around the dinner table, but what was the Camel Corps and what insights can it provide 
on U.S. military thinking in the mid-19th century? I believe that the Camel Corps 
Experiment, regardless of whether it was deemed an utter failure or not, demonstrated 
progressive military thought and the desire of its advocates to explore advancements in 
both mobility and technology for military practices. 
Where did the push for the utilization of camels come from in the first place? Historian 
Harold Schindler suggests that, like horses which were not native to America but 
flourished when introduced, camels too had the potential to be successful in theory. In 
the early 20th century, U.S. Army explorer Stephen Harriman Long wrote General 
Description of the Country Traversed by the Exploring Expedition, which included his 
description of parts of the West as “completely destitute” possessing little vegetation and 
sterile soil. His word choices in his description suggests that the American West held 
many desert-like qualities. For then Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, the American 
Desert represented a lack of the nation’s unity. The vast barren interior of the West 
presented the issue of disconnectedness because it was not easy or simple to travel. If a 
solution to the transportation problem in the West were achieved, it would not only 
connect the Western territories to the more populated East Coast, but it would also aid 
in creating a united nation of Americans. 
For some military and political leaders, camel transportation was the solution to the 
issues of unity and military transportation. Traveling and carrying materials by using 
wagons drawn by mules, horses, or oxen was time consuming and expensive, especially 
when considering the animals’ great dependency on water and grass – two factors that 
were not bountiful in the “American Desert.” Camels, on the other hand, could travel 
longer on fewer provisions. It is likely that Davis was a great supporter of this idea due 
to the encouragement of select group of peers, and because of his familiarity with 
Napoleon’s memoirs, which included the French leader’s own fascination with the 
dromedary camel (an Arabian one humped camel) and its hardiness. In 1855 Congress 
finally approved the experiment, and Major Wayne and Lieutenant David D. Porter, two 
men who played a significant part in convincing Davis to advocate for the camel project, 
acquired thirty-three camels from Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia. 
At first, the project seemed to go well. The camels were successful in their tests around 
San Antonio and Camp Verde, Texas. In addition to their lack of grass and water 
dependency, camels could ford rivers much easier than mules, carry heavier loads, and 
did not require shoeing. It seemed as if the only downside was the smell and appearance 
of the camels, which seemed to bother the horses – a seemingly small disadvantage 
compared to the supposed various advantages of camel utilization. Even Lieutenant-
Colonel Robert E. Lee, who had used camels on a patrol in 1860, praised the camels’ 
capabilities. 
Yet the experiment began to 
unravel as issues began to rise 
to the surface. The project had 
a lack of public support. 
Packers and freighters in the 
South disliked the economic 
competition and army men 
stationed at Camp Verde 
thought the experiment was 
ridiculous. In addition, a 
cultural barrier might have 
also contributed to the failure 
of the camel experiment. 
While some leaders of the 
project, such as George 
Perkins Marsh, had witnessed 
camel usage and traveled to 
Egypt, Syria, and Arabia, a 
majority of people (both 
civilians and government 
officials) were not well familiar 
with camel transportation. 
This reluctance to change from 
mules and horses to camels, as 
well as the potential lack of 
knowledge of how to utilize 
these animals to their full 
extent, could be a couple 
additional reasons why the 
camel experiment failed to 
gain the mass support it 
crucially needed. 
A photo of Old Douglas’s memorial 
marker at Cedar Hill Cemetery, 
Vicksburg, Mississippi. Taken 
by Natalie Maynor. 
 
By the eve of the Civil War, the experiment had collapsed. While camels were still 
present during the Civil War, Union forces did not use the camels found in Camp Tejon, 
California, because they could not understand how the camels could be used for any 
missions. Similarly, the Confederacy did not use the animals for any major operations. 
One notable exception lies in Douglas the camel. Affectionately known as Old Douglas, 
he was the only known camel to be used militarily east of the Mississippi River during 
the American Civil War. He become the mascot for the 43rd Mississippi Regiment, and 
also assisted in carrying baggage for the officers. During the Siege of Vicksburg, Old 
Douglas, who had been “harmlessly grazing,” was shot by Federal sharpshooters. In The 
Camel Regiment: A History of the Bloody 43rd Mississippi Volunteer Infantry, CSA, 
1862-65, Author Scott W. Bell includes Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Bevier’s account of 
what happened afterwards: Douglas was “pierced by several bullets at one discharge, 
and fell with a piteous, almost human moan, to expire in a strange land far from the 
‘help of Islam.’ All who saw it were highly incensed at this useless cruelty.” 
With this one exception of Douglas, the Camel Corps experiment can be interpreted as a 
failure. It was disbanded by Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton – who was supposedly 
unaware that such a project existed – and by the end of the Civil War, most of the 
camels were sold.  If the camel experiment can be regarded as unsuccessful, and perhaps 
even an embarrassment for the government who had invested a substantial amount of 
money in this project, is there any value to remembering this vailed venture? The camel 
corps experiment demonstrates the desire of military and political leaders to solve the 
issue of mobility apparent in the “American Desert”, and to promote connectedness of 
the nation – the latter idea which obviously fell apart during the American Civil War. 
The attempted utilization of camels in military operations and practices also indicates 
how government officials hoped to advance the nation’s military forces. Indeed, the 
Great Failed Camel Corps Experiment represents the idea of “trial and error”—through 
the failure of the camel experiment, other ideas of mobility for the “American Desert” 
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